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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/07/2011 Accident number: 754 
Accident time: 10:00 Accident Date: 07/05/2009 
Where it occurred: AF/13/1301/12978, 





Primary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 28/05/2009 
ID original source: None  Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 15/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
Inadequate detector pinpointing 
use of pick (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 




The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
File date: 28th May 2009 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] MDG-17 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION:  
An investigation team was convened by AMAC Kunduz to investigate the demining accident 
involving [the Victim] the De-miner from [Demining group] MDG-17. The accident occurred at 
10:00 hours on 07 May 2009 at minefield number AF/13/1301/12978/MF-5284, located in 
Wali Khail village, Baghlan district of Baghlan province. 
SUMMARY: 
Minefield # AF/13/1301/12978/MF-5284 is located in an area which was front line between 
different belligerent groups (northern Alliance and Sayed Kayan forces) during the year 1999 
to 2001. From the military point of view this area was important to the involved parties of the 
war, therefore, was exchanged between them for several times and each time they laid AP 
mines there to stop the attacks of opposition. So far 7 accidents happened there on human 
including 3 were fatal accidents.  
On 01st of April 2009 the [Demining group] MDG-17 was tasked to start clearance operation 
in mentioned area. The area was divided to 2 tasks by polygon survey team of [Other 
demining group]. The size of task under [Demining group] operations is about 61000 sqm. 
Around 37700 sqm of the total size was cleared by MDG-17 till the accident time, they 
found/destroyed 34 AP mines.   
On 07th of May at 10:00 hours the de-miner [the Victim] was working in his clearance lane 
excavating a detected signal by unsuitable excavation tool (Pick). He hit the top of mine with a 
pick and caused it to go off. According to the investigation report the signal was not 
pinpointed correctly and the de-miner has used his pick carelessly. As a result he sustained 
multiple superficial injuries on his eyes, chest, Face, and both hands, the injured parts of the 
deminer body and his PPE clearly indicate that he had not used his PPE during operation. 
Because there is no any damage on his PPE to show that it was used properly.  
CONCLUSIONS: 
However the investigation report concluded that the deminer was careless during operation 
and poor supervision has also had its role in this accident. But this is not the first case of 
using picks by [Demining group] teams. There are Non-conformity reports on [Demining 
group] teams for using picks during investigation of signals. And also there is another 
accident of the same nature in 2008. The NCRs and lessons learned reports were shared 
with [Demining group] but no action is taken so far.  
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered: 
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• Standard and appropriate tools of prodding and excavation should be used during 
operations.  
• The de-miner should pinpoint the signal properly, mark and then start excavation 
according to the set procedure. 
• Full PPE must be worn correctly during operations on a hazard area. There is no 
exception to the involved personnel. 
• The command group should strengthen their supervision during operation and stop 
the de-miners from conducting drills in contrary to SOPs. 
• [Demining group] operations department is to take this issue serious and come up 
with practical solution to it. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 944 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Chest; minor Eyes; minor Face; minor Hands 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . multiple superficial injuries on his 
eyes, chest, Face, and both hands". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Inadequate equipment  because the 
investigators found that the Pick-axe was inappropriate and was being used in defiance of 
earlier instructions. The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy 
because the group’s management has the responsibility for the issue of appropriate tools and 
training. The Victim’s failure to pinpoint the Ceia detector reading appropriately implies a 
failure of training or equipment (or both). 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility. 
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